April 2024 - MANRS Community - MANRS Mailing Lists

1st MANRS Community Meeting 2024 (May 15)
by Alejandro Fernández-Cernuda April 30, 2024

April 30, 2024

Dear MANRS participants: We are pleased to inform you that the first meeting of the MANRS Community in 2024 will take place next May 15 (May 16 for some of you joining from the APAC region): In order to facilitate participation from all over the world, we have organized the meeting in two sessions running at different times: - Session East: 8:00 am UTC <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jll4YGXpW7Y9pg…> (4:00 am New York / 10:00 am Brussels / 4:00 pm Singapore) - Session West: 8:00 pm UTC <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jll4YGXpW7Y9pg…> (4:00 pm New York / 10:00 pm Brussels / 4:00 am +1 Singapore) Please use the Zoom links above to register for the session you would like to attend (registration is mandatory and participation is restricted to MANRS participants). Please note that the sessions will be recorded. Both sessions will have the following agenda (the starting time will be 8:00 am/pm UTC, according to the information above): - 8:00 – 8:05 Opening and Welcome by the Steering Committee Chair - 8:05 – 8:45 Updates from the Secretariat - Welcome and Round of Introductions - Introducing Global Cyber Alliance, the New Secretariat + Q&A - MANRS Updates from the Secretariat + Q&A - 8:45 – 9:45 Insights into Routing Security - Wrap-up, New Section Outline, and Introduction of Speakers - Regulatory and Policy Update + Q&A - Global Trends in Routing Security + Q&A - 9:45 – 10:00 Community Forum (Discussion) Some of the hot topics of the meeting will include the Global Cyber Alliance’s new role ahead of the initiative’s Secretariat <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jll2-6qcW7Y8-P…>, the latest updates from the Observatory and the Community <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JlF2-6qcW8wLKS…>, and the recent news in the regulatory front <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jll2-6qcW7Y8-P…>, but there will be much more to cover. We look forward to a well engaged meeting, where different visions can be shared and where participation is high. Please try to register as soon as your calendars allow, and do not hesitate to contact us if you would like to bring up any new topics or comments: *contact(a)manrs.org <contact(a)manrs.org>*. Thanks for your continued support, and see you on May 15, • • • • Alejandro Fernández-Cernuda Díaz Director of Engagement, Internet Integrity Program Global Cyber Alliance afcernuda(a)globalcyberalliance.org +32 28823050 Click here <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jl22-6qcW7lCdL…> to book a meeting on my calendar. GCA Brussels Rond Point Schuman 6 1040 Brussels Belgium [image: GCA Website] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> [image: GCA Twitter] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> [image: GCA Facebook] <https://www.facebook.com/GlobalCyberAlliance/> [image: GCA LinkedIn] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jl22-6qcW7lCdL…> [image: GCA YouTube] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jl22-6qcW7lCdL…> [image: GCA GitHub] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> [image: GCA Email Signup] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> [image: GCA Instagram] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> [image: GCA Forums] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> GCA takes your privacy seriously. To review our privacy policy, please click here <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jl22-6qcW7lCdL…> .

1 0

MANRS Community Meeting 2024, Semester 1 (May 15)
by Alejandro Fernández-Cernuda April 30, 2024

April 30, 2024

Dear MANRS participants: We are pleased to inform you that the first meeting of the MANRS Community in 2024 will take place next May 15 (May 16 for some of you joining from the APAC region): In order to facilitate participation from all over the world, we have organized the meeting in two sessions running at different times: - Session East: 8:00 am UTC <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jll4YGXpW7Y9pg…> (4:00 am New York / 10:00 am Brussels / 4:00 pm Singapore) - Session West: 8:00 pm UTC <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jll4YGXpW7Y9pg…> (4:00 pm New York / 10:00 pm Brussels / 4:00 am +1 Singapore) Please use the Zoom links above to register for the session you would like to attend (registration is mandatory and participation is restricted to MANRS participants). Please note that the sessions will be recorded. Both sessions will have the following agenda (the starting time will be 8:00 am/pm UTC, according to the information above): - 8:00 – 8:05 Opening and Welcome by the Steering Committee Chair - 8:05 – 8:40 Updates from the Secretariat - Welcome and Round of Introductions - Introducing Global Cyber Alliance, the New Secretariat + Q&A - MANRS Updates from the Secretariat + Q&A - 8:45 – 9:45 Insights into Routing Security - Wrap-up, New Section Outline, and Introduction of Speakers - Regulatory and Policy Update + Q&A - Global Trends in Routing Security + Q&A - 9:45 – 10:00 Community Forum (Discussion) Some of the hot topics of the meeting will include the Global Cyber Alliance’s new role ahead of the initiative’s Secretariat <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jll2-6qcW7Y8-P…>, the latest updates from the Observatory and the Community <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JlF2-6qcW8wLKS…>, and the recent news in the regulatory front <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jll2-6qcW7Y8-P…>, but there will be much more to cover. We look forward to a well engaged meeting, where different visions can be shared and where participation is high. Please try to register as soon as your calendars allow, and do not hesitate to contact us if you would like to bring up any new topics or comments: *contact(a)manrs.org <contact(a)manrs.org>*. Thanks for your continued support, and see you on May 15, • • • • Alejandro Fernández-Cernuda Díaz Director of Engagement, Internet Integrity Program Global Cyber Alliance afcernuda(a)globalcyberalliance.org +32 28823050 Click here <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jl22-6qcW7lCdL…> to book a meeting on my calendar. GCA Brussels Rond Point Schuman 6 1040 Brussels Belgium [image: GCA Website] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> [image: GCA Twitter] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> [image: GCA Facebook] <https://www.facebook.com/GlobalCyberAlliance/> [image: GCA LinkedIn] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jl22-6qcW7lCdL…> [image: GCA YouTube] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jl22-6qcW7lCdL…> [image: GCA GitHub] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> [image: GCA Email Signup] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> [image: GCA Instagram] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> [image: GCA Forums] <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/JkM2-6qcW6N1vH…> GCA takes your privacy seriously. To review our privacy policy, please click here <https://csVV404.na1.hs-sales-engage.com/Ctc/WZ+23284/csVV404/Jl22-6qcW7lCdL…> .

1 0

Routine Monitoring of Source Address Validation Deployment by Operators
by Brandon Zhi April 27, 2024

April 27, 2024

Dear MANRS and RIPE members, My name is Gaoxing Zhang, and I am a computer enthusiast from the High School Competition Team at Hangzhou Dongfang High School. Recently, I've observed that although MANRS requirements mandate Source Address Validation(SAV) for its members, some operators have not fully implemented this practice in their networks. Therefore, I propose to routinely monitor the deployment status of SAV across ASNs to ensure compliance with MANRS guidelines and enhance network security. I am currently unaware of any existing projects with a similar focus. It has come to my attention that operators at IXP facilities, even including major entities like Google, fail to enable SAV. This issue also persists in-home broadband services obtained through PPPoE, which could lead to Infected Home Routers becoming sources of DDoS Attacks and Are Difficult to Trace. In my tests, I announced my IP thought tunnel on a different operator’s network and configured the Next-hop Address to a home broadband gateway obtained via PPPoE. The results indicated that Source Address Validation by China Telecom’s home broadband is only partially implemented in Mainland China, with most IP addresses from the region being accessible through this method. Here are some methods I have considered for ongoing monitoring: 1. Announce a new IP block upstream to receive inbound traffic. 2. Deploy a tunnel on the device connected to the ISP being tested, which will link to the upstream receiving the inbound traffic. 3. The IP block will not be announced to the ISP being tested but only to the upstream used to receive inbound traffic. Check the connectivity to major public DNS servers when the Next-hop address is set to the ISP being tested. 4. If it is reachable, it indicates that the ISP’s device lacks Source Address Validation. I plan to deploy test equipment at major IXPs (currently seeking equipment sponsors) and access points for some residential ISPs (with the assistance of volunteers). The testing environment will be a Linux-based VM, utilizing Python to switch Next-hop based on test targets and assess the accessibility to major public DNS servers, as well as to upload data to a backend system. I would really appreciate it if you could share your valuable suggestions or feedback on this initiative. Best regards, *Brandon Zhang* HUIZE LTD www.huize.asia <https://huize.asia/>| www.ixp.su | Twitter This e-mail and any attachments or any reproduction of this e-mail in whatever manner are confidential and for the use of the addressee(s) only. HUIZE LTD can’t take any liability and guarantee of the text of the email message and virus.

2 1

Routine Monitoring of Source Address Validation Deployment by Operators
by Brandon April 26, 2024

April 26, 2024

Dear MANRS and RIPE members, My name is Gaoxing Zhang, and I am a computer enthusiast from the High School Competition Team at Hangzhou Dongfang High School. Recently, I've observed that although MANRS requirements mandate Source Address Validation(SAV) for its members, some operators have not fully implemented this practice in their networks. Therefore, I propose to routinely monitor the deployment status of SAV across ASNs to ensure compliance with MANRS guidelines and enhance network security. I am currently unaware of any existing projects with a similar focus. It has come to my attention that operators at IXP facilities, even including major entities like Google, fail to enable SAV. This issue also persists in-home broadband services obtained through PPPoE, which could lead to Infected Home Routers becoming sources of DDoS Attacks and Are Difficult to Trace. In my tests, I announced my IP thought tunnel on a different operator’s network and configured the Next-hop Address to a home broadband gateway obtained via PPPoE. The results indicated that Source Address Validation by China Telecom’s home broadband is only partially implemented in Mainland China, with most IP addresses from the region being accessible through this method. Here are some methods I have considered for ongoing monitoring: 1. Announce a new IP block upstream to receive inbound traffic. 2. Deploy a tunnel on the device connected to the ISP being tested, which will link to the upstream receiving the inbound traffic. 3. The IP block will not be announced to the ISP being tested but only to the upstream used to receive inbound traffic. Check the connectivity to major public DNS servers when the Next-hop address is set to the ISP being tested. 4. If it is reachable, it indicates that the ISP’s device lacks Source Address Validation. I plan to deploy test equipment at major IXPs (currently seeking equipment sponsors) and access points for some residential ISPs (with the assistance of volunteers). The testing environment will be a Linux-based VM, utilizing Python to switch Next-hop based on test targets and assess the accessibility to major public DNS servers, as well as to upload data to a backend system. I would really appreciate it if you could share your valuable suggestions or feedback on this initiative. Best regards, *Brandon Zhang* Huicast Telecom Limited www.huicast.com | Twitter This e-mail and any attachments or any reproduction of this e-mail in whatever manner are confidential and for the use of the addressee(s) only. Huicast Telecom Limited can’t take any liability and guarantee of the text of the email message and virus.

1 0